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The Enduring Lessons of the Iraq Sanctions
Joy Gordon In: 294 (Spring 2020)
he economic sanctions imposed on Iraq by the United Nations Security
Council, from 1990 to 2003, may well lay claim to be the worst
humanitarian catastrophe ever imposed in the name of global governance. The
unconscionable human damage done by those sanctions is routinely dismissed
as the unintended consequence of a well-intentioned policy from the past,
which has since given way to more nuanced and humane measures. But in fact,
the Iraq sanctions program is the template for the systemic, devastating
sanctions we see in place today, albeit in a subtler and more circuitous form.
In August of 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. With the Soviet Union collapsing, the
UN Security Council was no longer paralyzed by the mutual veto power of its
permanent members—the United States, USSR, Britain, France and China—and
entered a period of “activism,” where measures of unprecedented scope and
severity were suddenly possible. The sanctions imposed on Iraq in UN
Resolution 661 on August 6, 1990 were the  rst of these measures, prohibiting
all imports and all exports with Iraq, with only the narrowest exemptions for
medicine.
Global sanctions of such breadth had not been possible during the Cold War: if
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Iraqis receive food rations in Baghdad, June 2000. Faleh Kheiber/Reuters
the United States sanctioned a country, it could turn to the Soviet bloc for
trade, and vice versa. While there was broad international participation in the
sanctions against South Africa, the sanctions themselves never went so far as
to prevent imports of humanitarian goods or cripple the country’s
infrastructure. But the Security Council’s sanctions against Iraq were a
demonstration of just how far such economic measures could go, and how
much damage could be done under the auspices of global governance. Those
countries that were reluctant to join in this undertaking had little choice in the
matter. Under Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security
Council has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security,” and notes that the member states agree that in this regard the
Security Council “acts on their behalf.”  In Article 25, the implications of this are
made explicit: the member states of the United Nations “agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter.” There is no provision for opting out, or even raising questions, in the













The United States and Britain Maximize the Sanctions’ Damage
 
The sanctions alone would not necessarily have been catastrophic for Iraq. The
government immediately implemented a rationing system, which was critical in
staving o  famine, as well as measures to increase agricultural production. But
then the bombing campaign of the Persian Gulf War of January 1991 destroyed
much of Iraq’s infrastructure. An envoy from the UN Secretary-General
described Iraq’s condition as “near-apocalyptic,” noting that Iraq had been
reduced to a “pre-industrial age.”[1] For the next 12 years, the sanctions
crippled the e orts of Iraq, as well as UN agencies such as the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the
World Health Organization (WHO), to restore electricity, transportation, health
care and food security.
If the sanctions could legitimately be compared to siege warfare, the
enforcement of the “no- y zones,” as well as other military incursions, were
warfare by more conventional means. With questionable authority, the United
States and Britain (and France, until 1996) enforced no- y zones that ultimately
covered over 40 percent of Iraq. Over 250,000 sorties were  own, bombing
hundreds of targets.[2] In 1998, in Operation Desert Fox, the United States and
Britain struck nearly 100 sites in Iraq, using over 1,000 bombs and cruise
missiles. And airstrikes escalated considerably in the run-up to the US-led
invasion in 2003.
The pattern that emerged throughout the sanctions
period was that the United States and Britain,
sometimes accompanied by other allies,
consistently sought to maximize the damage done
in Iraq, ostensibly to destabilize President Saddam
Hussein’s regime. The United States and its allies
would sometimes agree to humanitarian provisions,
but would then vitiate them in some way. This
practice was apparent from the very beginning, and
continued throughout George H.W. Bush’s
administration, both Clinton administrations and
that of George W. Bush. Resolution 661 allowed food to be delivered to Iraq in
the event of “humanitarian circumstances.” Some members of the Security
Council argued that this wording meant food shipments should be allowed
immediately, since Iraq was dependent on imports to meet two-thirds of its
food needs. But the United States, Britain, Canada and others interpreted this
language to mean that there must be irrefutable evidence of famine before
food could be allowed into Iraq. As a result, no food imports to Iraq were
permitted for eight months, until the entire country had been reduced to
rubble. Only then did the Security Council acknowledge that “humanitarian
circumstances” were present and started allowing food shipments.[3]
Soon after the start of shipments, as members of the Security Council called for
explicit guidelines to allow food, clothing, agricultural equipment, water and
sanitation equipment as well as educational materials, the United States would
agree only to an informal agreement that members of the Council would “look
favorably” on these goods. Within a few months, the United States was once
again routinely blocking these items.[4]
The Oil for Food Program, initiated in 1995, in principle allowed Iraq to sell oil
and to use the funds generated by oil sales to purchase humanitarian goods. In
practice, both oil sales and humanitarian purchases were undermined at every
juncture. To begin with, 30 percent of the proceeds from oil sales went to pay
reparations for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, through a process that paid out
considerable sums of money, sometimes on the basis of scant evidence. Then,
in 2001, the Security Council introduced a policy of “retroactive oil pricing,”
ostensibly in response to corruption in oil sales.[5] Under this policy,
purchasers were required to sign oil contracts blindly, without knowing what
the price would be; the Security Council committee overseeing the Iraq
sanctions would set the price retroactively, in the following month. In e ect,
this rule made it commercially unfeasible to purchase oil from Iraq.
Unsurprisingly, oil sales collapsed, and billions of dollars in contracts for












Iraq for months or
years.
The Deadly Impact of the Dual Use Rationale
 
The delivery of humanitarian goods was equally compromised, mainly because
of the e orts of the United States and Britain within the 661 Committee, the
committee of the Security Council that oversaw the Iraq sanctions, and whose
approval was required for almost all contracts. Throughout the sanctions
regime, this process was always highly politicized. After the mid-1990s, the only
countries on the committee that blocked or delayed humanitarian goods were
the United States and Britain; and of those, the United States was responsible
for 90-95 percent of the holds. In principle, the so-called holds were di erent
from denials: holds were ostensibly in place while members were reviewing the
applications or awaiting further information. In practice, the holds involved an
opaque and arbitrary process, in which billions of dollars of urgent goods
related to food production, water treatment, road repair, electricity,
transportation and telecommunications were prevented from arriving in Iraq
for months or years.
Often, the US rationale was that these were dual use
goods with both military and civilian uses. But of
course, everything that is part of the infrastructure
of a civilian economy is also used by the military:
electricity, roads, telephones, construction
equipment, vehicles and so on. It could be said that
all of this came down to one determination: for
goods that are critical for the basic needs and well-
being of the civilian population, but are also used by
the military, the decision was to impose almost a
blanket denial, regardless of the hardship and
su ering that the civilian population would bear.
And that is indeed what happened. Medicines were
allowed in, but not the refrigerators or trucks
needed for the cold chain, without which the medicines would be unusable. A
water treatment plant was allowed—something of great urgency, given the
epidemics of water-borne diseases such as cholera and typhoid—but not the
generator needed to run the plant, with the rationale that it was dual use.
Nearly all computer equipment was blocked on the same grounds, including
computers needed for hospitals and schools. A wide range of educational
goods were blocked, ranging from medical textbooks to equipment for
teaching science at the secondary school and university level. Equipment for
irrigation and desalinization was blocked or delayed for months or years,
compromising Iraq’s agricultural production. Citing dual use concerns, fertilizer
and pesticides were often blocked or delayed until the planting season was
over, rendering them useless. Equipment for dairy production was blocked or
delayed for months or years, as were animal vaccines necessary for raising
sheep and goats.  Some $5.5 billion in these goods were still on hold up
through the summer of 2002, when the process was taken over by professional
UN sta , who quickly removed the majority of the holds to allow delivery.[7] 
From the beginning, it was clear that the humanitarian cost was
unconscionable; and there was continual condemnation from human rights
organizations, and opposition from many members of the Security Council as
well as numerous entities within the United Nations. At each point where there
were calls to reduce the humanitarian damage, the United States and Britain
went to great lengths to block reforms.
In 1996, Security Council Resolution 1051 provided a mechanism for monitoring
the export of dual use goods to Iraq, involving the International Atomic Energy
Agency as well as UN weapons inspectors ( rst the United Nations Special
Commission, UNSCOM, and then its successor, the United Nations Monitoring,
Veri cation and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC). These weapons inspectors
were tasked with determining whether vehicles, electrical equipment or other
items in fact presented a security threat. In principle, this step ought to have
depoliticized the process. Instead, throughout the Oil For Food Program, the
United States continued to block critical supplies needed in areas such as
agriculture, water treatment and electricity generation, claiming they presented
a security risk, even though the weapons inspectors had made a determination
to the contrary.
By 2001, as the United States faced harsh international condemnation for its
practices, President George W. Bush’s administration sought to de ect criticism
while maintaining its core practices. Framing their e ort as “smart sanctions,”
US diplomats proposed that the Security Council committee overseeing the
sanctions adopt a Goods Review List. They proposed a list that would carry the
imprimatur of the Security Council, although it would largely re ect the United
States’ own very extreme views; for example, the United States had repeatedly
prevented Iraq from importing atropine, a drug necessary for any surgery
involving general anesthesia, on the very speculative grounds that it might
somehow be self-injected by Iraqi soldiers during battle as an antidote to nerve
gas.[8] By including atropine as a dual use item on the Goods Review List, the
Security Council would be seen as the agent of this extreme and bizarre
position, rather than the United States.
 
The Deep Human Damage of Sanctions
 
The invasion of Iraq in 2003, driven by baseless claims that Iraq had developed
weapons of mass destruction, is well known. But little has been written on the
enduring e ects of the sanctions. In order to look at the current e ects of the
sanctions, they have to be disentangled from the 17 years of intervening
events. But there are some observations that can be made about the long-term
harm done by the UN sanctions regime.
One clear e ect is the impact of the ongoing, widespread malnutrition that took
place throughout the sanctions regime. In 1993, the UN’s World Food Program
and the Food and Agriculture Organization reported that, “notwithstanding the
justi cation for their imposition, the sanctions have caused persistent
deprivation, severe hunger and malnutrition for a vast majority of the Iraqi
population, particularly the vulnerable groups—children under  ve, expectant
/nursing women, widows, orphans, the sick, the elderly and disabled.”[9] In
1997, Ko  Annan noted that 31 percent of children under the age of  ve
su ered from malnutrition.[10] In 2000, a UNICEF o cial informed the 661
Committee that 25 percent of children in south and central governorates
su ered from chronic malnutrition, which was often irreversible, and 9 percent
from acute malnutrition.[11] Food insecurity and widespread malnutrition
With the onset of
hyperin ation, and
the lack of income
from oil sales, the
state was unable to
pay livable salaries.
What followed was





continued throughout the 13 years of sanctions. The e ects of ongoing
malnutrition, particularly among children, are well known and include long-
term health problems and cognitive de cits.
The enduring e ects of the sanctions are also visible
in less obvious ways. One of the explicit objectives
of the sanctions, and certainly one of their
achievements, was the bankrupting of the state.
While this result was often framed as “denying
Saddam access to funds,” in fact the impact was far
broader. With the onset of hyperin ation, and the
lack of income from oil sales, the state was unable
to pay livable salaries. What followed was a massive
loss of sta ng throughout critical government
institutions. Huge numbers of engineers, doctors,
teachers and civil servants left their positions, and
took up driving taxis or odd jobs to make ends
meet. For example, 40,000 teachers left their jobs
over the course of the 1990s, and the state  lled in the gaps by hiring less-
quali ed teachers. Prior to 1990, teachers had three to  ve years of training
after secondary school; by the end of the 1990s, 20 percent had only one year
of training before starting to teach.[12] At the same time, the expertise to
manage the educational system eroded: 15 percent of planning personnel at
the national level left their jobs; 22 percent at the regional level left. As a result,
the Ministry of Education used school teachers with no training in management
to plan and direct educational operations.[13]
At a time when ingenuity was badly needed to run the electricity facilities and
water treatment plants without the necessary parts and equipment, the
number of quali ed technicians plummeted. As the most experienced
professionals left their jobs, or left the country, they were replaced not only by
fewer people, but by those with far less experience. Even after the sanctions
were lifted, while new hires could be made, what could not be replaced was the
level of experience and institutional memory. Prior to 1990, Iraqi doctors,
scientists, diplomats and archaeologists routinely obtained advanced degrees
in Europe and the United States and circulated at the leading conferences in
their  elds. What we see now is a population with far lower levels of literacy, far
fewer people with professional competence and professionals who are far less
cosmopolitan. Now it is common to hear that university students are rarely
 uent enough in English to read textbooks or research materials published in
the United States or Europe. An Iraqi living in the United States told me that
when he visited Iraq in the 1980s and early 1990s, his family members would
sometimes ask his help in translating a document written in English. Now, he
said, when he returns to Iraq, the level of basic literacy has deteriorated so
profoundly that he is asked to help friends and family read documents in
Arabic.
The deep, human damage that followed the sanctions was foreseeable, and
indeed, was foreseen. In 1999, Anupama Rao Singh, the head of UNICEF in Iraq,
met with US Congressional sta  on a fact- nding mission to Iraq. In their
report, they wrote: “She urged the delegation to look at the situation facing
children now, and how these economic problems caused by sanctions will have
a major impact on their future. She pointed to examples of civil unrest in Africa
and elsewhere, usually caused by disa ected youth with no hope of education,
job, or a future. There is just such a generation of Iraqis growing up now, she
said, with no hope, no connection to the outside world, isolated. And that will
be very dangerous.”[14]
 
Rethinking the Use of Sanctions
 
But the Iraq sanctions have left another legacy as well: a template for doing
terrible and indiscriminate harm, by economic means, with little accountability.
The United States imposes sanctions on more countries than all other nations
or international institutions combined. Even when the United States acts
unilaterally, the sanctions may e ectively exclude a target country from much
of the international banking system, or from the world’s largest market. When
the United States blacklists individuals or companies, the impact can be far










shipping lines or a national oil company, the impact can go well beyond the
“bad actor” who is the ostensible target. When the United States undermines a
country’s access to fuel, to major banks and insurers, to shipping companies or
in other ways compromises a country’s imports and exports generally, the
damage to the economy can be tremendous. US sanctions routinely involve all
of these practices.
In February, Rep. Ilhan Omar introduced the
Congressional Oversight of Sanctions Act, intended
to give Congress a greater role when the executive
branch imposes sanctions regimes under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA). Under IEEPA, the president is given broad
powers to act in times of national emergency.  As
the bill notes, however, the “emergencies” declared
since 2000 have, on average, lasted over a decade
each.[15] The bill includes a safe harbor provision,
requiring sanctions regimes to exempt goods
related to civilian healthcare facilities, water infrastructure, civilian energy
infrastructure and primary and secondary schools. It also calls for reports on
the anticipated humanitarian impact of measures such as sanctions.
Certainly this is a good start: if sanctions are to do less harm to vulnerable
populations, it begins with accountability, by means of oversight and
monitoring. But at the same time, the US Congress does not itself have a
particularly good track record in attending to the humanitarian consequences
of the sanctions regimes it establishes and maintains. The statutes that
tightened the sanctions on Cuba in the 1990s, which are still in e ect today,
compromise Cuba’s access to shipping, penalize countries that import goods
from Cuba, target Cuba’s major industries and exports and penalize banks that
handle Cuba’s  nancial transactions—measures of vast scope, restricting and
punishing not only US nationals, but foreign banks, foreign shipping companies
and foreign manufacturers. Congress’ sanctions on Cuba have been almost
universally condemned each year by the United Nations General Assembly, as
violations of international commercial law and international humanitarian law.
But these measures remain in place; and Congress shows no interest in
reversing them.
The standard narrative about the Iraq sanctions is that they were well-
intentioned, with unfortunate and unforeseeable consequences for infants and
children, women, the elderly, the poor; that the Security Council committee
charged with their oversight did whatever was possible to mitigate those
unfortunate consequences; that “smart sanctions” were introduced out of
concern for Iraq’s vulnerable populations; and in any case, that was all in the
past, and no one does that sort of thing any more. But the experience of the
sanctions on Iraq is not at all in the past. We see the enduring e ects of the
sanctions on Iraqis today. Moreover, we see the cruel, devastating logic and
strategy of the Iraq case in contemporary sanctions regimes. Any rethinking of
US policy toward the Middle East must consider the legacies of the Iraq
sanctions regime: it is not enough to express regret and vague remorse after
the fact.  As long as there is no independent monitoring, and a credible
structure of accountability, to ensure that US measures abide by international
law—particularly international humanitarian law—the tragedies will continue to
take place.
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